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Abstract  
Relationships between corporate governance mechanisms and the financial performance of Islamic banks 
have been researched extensively in prior empirical research. However, the results are mixed, mainly due 
to the heterogeneity of the samples used for the empirical investigations. This paper reports the results of  
a  meta-analysis of the existing literature on governance mechanisms from which a framework was 
developed to  guide the constructions of governance indices. The results showed that Islamic banks banks 
tend to have better financial performance if there was (1) a higher proportion of independent directors on 
the board; (2) the Shari”ah Supervisory Board was large and consisted of top scholars; (3)numerous 
directors; (4) the CEO was chairman; (5) auditing was enforced and (6) ownership structure was 
dispersed, reducing shareholding of directors, foreigners and institutional investors, while increasing 
family and governments’ shareholding. Managers’ shareholding was insignificant. 
Keywords  
corporate governance, financial performance, meta-analysis, Islamic banks 
Introduction 
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the 4th largest investment bank in US, filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, marking the largest ever bankruptcy in the American history. It 
was followed by the massive exodus of most of its clients, drastic losses in its stock, and devaluation 
of its assets by credit rating agencies. The aftermaths of the 2008 US subprime mortgage crisis urged 
the banking sector to review their governance models. Rarick (2009) introduced the “Islamic system” 
as an optimal substitute to the existing capitalistic model to the Global Financial Crisis. However, 
without proper understanding of the role corporate governance play on the performance of Islamic 
banks themselves, how dare one suggest such quick remedy?     
Corporate governance has already grown into an established and well studied subject being in 
academia as well as in practice (Clarke, 
2004, Classens, 2006). Corporate 
governance is mainly concerned with  
control and decision making at the top of 
organisations and, in particular, corporate 
boards’ roles, composition and 
accountability. Until now, corporate 
governance has mostly been dedicated to 
and concerned with  traditional western 
corporations. Many studies have focused 
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on large western banks with many thousands of employees, and that are publicly traded on the stock 
market with a free float of shares of shareholders with only a small proportion of equity held in the 
firm. There is only scarce evidence on corporate governance in the Islamic banking sector. 
The dramatic growth of the Islamic banking sector around the world merits its significance in the 
financial market. Hence,  the focus of this study was to summarise the evidence for, and determine the 
relationship between, corporate governance and financial performance of Islamic banks. This would  
also identify areas for future research as well as  inform policy decision-making by Islamic banking 
regulators.  
Thus, the research question is: What is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and financial performance of Islamic banks? 
For Islamic Financial institutions,  conflicts of interest are two-folded, meaning that they have to face 
the separation of ownership and control as well as the Shari”ah compliance on behalf of the 
regulators. Thus, this paper analyses both traditional corporate governance mechanisms applicable to 
Western banks and the Shari”ah Supervisory Board (SSB).  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature pertinent to corporate 
governance and financial performance of Islamic banks and develops the research hypotheses, 
covering six major corporate governance mechanisms, namely board independence, Shari”ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB), board size, CEO duality, ownership structure and auditing. Section 3 
provides the methodological details of the meta-analysis. The results are reported in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes with a summary and discussion of the research findings, acknowledges the 
limitation of this study, and identifies future research directions.  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
A literature search has identified a number of governance mechanisms pertinent to the financial 
performance of Islamic Banks, including board independence, Shari”ah Supervisory Board (SSB), 
board size, CEO duality, ownership structure and auditing (Chapra and Ahmed 2002). Thirteen 
research hypotheses concerning each corporate governance mechanism were drawn from the relevant 
literature reviewed below.  
2.1 Board independence 
Under  Agency Theory, independent directors are more likely to be effective in monitoring the control 
of assets by the professional managers in that the independent directors are more likely to objectively 
question and evaluate the performance of both management and the firm (Kesner and Johnson 1990). 
Prior research suggests that there is an association between independent directors and stronger 
corporate governance, in the forms of reducing the likelihood of a firm paying greenmail and facing 
shareholder lawsuits, experiencing a negative market reaction to the announcement of a poison bill 
adoption, more appropriate design of CEO compensation policy, acting on behalf of stakeholders in 
order to secure higher premiums for tenders, making better acquisition decisions and promoting 
ethical financial reporting codes (de Villiers, Naiker, et al. 2011).  
H1: There is a positive relationship between board independence and financial performance.  
2.2 Shari”ah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
The main distinction between Islamic banks and conventional banks lies in the requirement for the 
operations of Islamic banks to be in accordance with the Islamic Shari‟ah. This requirement provides 
the foundation for the operation of Islamic banks to be guided by the principles and values laid down 
in Islam. Furthermore, it has been argued that the integrity of an Islamic bank would be undermined, 
and stakeholders would lose confidence, if its operation was found to be non-compliant to the 
Shari‟ah (Alman 2012). 
As the main objective of the establishment of an Islamic bank is the provision of financial activities 
that are Shari‟ah compliant, the shareholders and stakeholders of an Islamic bank are expected to put 
pressure on the bank to accomplish this objective. The investment decision of the shareholders, for 
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example, is deemed to be influenced by the assurance that the activities of the bank and the profit 
generated from them are Shari‟ah compliant. In addition, institutional investors who usually hold a 
large stake in the shareholding of a corporation would exercise their voting power to decide on the 
policies and business operations that would provide a positive return on their investment while 
ensuring the ethical aspect of the Islamic banking operation remains intact. Meanwhile, to ensure that 
the credibility of the bank is preserved in accordance with the expectations of these shareholders, the 
board of directors would monitor the management and require the latter to report to them that the 
activities of the bank are Shari‟ah compliant. These tasks are undertaken with the assistance of an 
external and independent Shari‟ah board which comprises experts on Shari‟ah and on fiqh al-
mua‟malat-related knowledge. The Shari‟ah board advises the board of directors on the Shari‟ah 
aspects of the Islamic banking operation and the latter carry out a Shari‟ah compliance review of the 
bank. The conclusions drawn by the Shari‟ah board based on the results of the Shari‟ah compliance 
review are published in a Shari‟ah report that is issued annually along with the financial statements of 
the bank. 
The Shari‟ah compliance review of an Islamic bank’s activities is considered to be a crucial 
governance mechanism to ensure the credibility and viability of the financial institutions because of 
the requirement for Islamic banks to adhere to the Islamic Shari‟ah principles. For this reason, many 
banks offering Islamic banking products and services have established a SSB whose membership and 
hierarchical position in the bank is deemed to stand no comparison to other types of supervisory 
boards.  
The available literature presents a growing interest in the issue of the governance functions of the 
Shari‟ah board in Islamic banks (Hassan 2012). According to Hassan (2012), in the Islamic Banking 
industry, the SSB mainly serves the following three functions: (i) at the macro level, SSB assumes 
regulatory authority; (ii) SSB at the micro level supervises the Shari”ah compliance of the Islamic 
banks; (iii) SSB is an useful source for business development; and (iv) SSB operates independently. 
H2: SSB is positively related to the financial performance of Islamic banks. 
2.3 Board size 
Of all the corporate governance mechanisms, boards of directors and in particular board composition 
and board size have received much attention in the media and business community (Adams, Hermalin 
et al. 2008; Brown, Beekes et al. 2011; van Essen, Oosterhout et al. 2012). However, a confirmative 
answer for the relationship between board size and performance of small firms is yet to be established. 
Agency Theory argues for a smaller board in that it saves transaction costs associated with the group 
thinking problem and related unnecessary costs to reach consensus. While the Resource Dependency 
Theory claims that a larger board will not only provide the monitoring function of the boards but also 
enrich the Islamic bank’s resource in the form of their collection of expertise and resources.  
H3: Board size is positively correlated with financial performance of Islamic banks. 
2.4 CEO duality 
A dual role of CEO and chairman is a key characteristic of insider power and considered an indicator 
of weak corporate governance (Larcker et al. 2007, Yermack 1996). Most U.S. companies have 
traditionally appointed a single individual to the roles of both chairman of the board and CEO. This 
concentration of power can permit the CEO to effectively control information available to other board 
members and can impede effective monitoring (see Jensen, 1993).This duality was present in 
companies involved in fraud (e.g., Enron, Worldcom, and Global Crossing). As well, Beasley et al. 
(1999) found that the CEO was involved in 72% of the frauds which they examined. Several studies 
have examined the separation of CEO and chairman of the board, positing that agency problems are 
higher when the same person occupies the two positions. Using a sample of 452USA public firms 
between 1984 and 1991,Yermack (1996) showed that firms are more valuable when the CEO and the 
chairman of the board positions are occupied by different persons. Carpeto et al.(2005) found that the 
decision to split the roles of CEO and board chair is associated with positive and significant abnormal 
returns. Similarly, Larcker et al. (2007) concluded that the duality role of CEO and chairman is a key 
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indicator of weak corporate governance. Therefore, the Cadbury Committee recommended separating 
the roles of the CEO and board chair to ensure a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the 
company (Al Manaseer, Al-Hindawi, et al. 2012). 
H4: CEO duality can improve the financial performance of Islamic banks. 
2.5 Ownership structure 
According to Berle and Means (1932), the modern corporation is characterized by the separation of 
ownership from control. Recent work on separation of ownership and control has shown that 
ownership concentration levels have important implications for firm performance. The impact of 
ownership on firm performance is two-folded. On the one hand, the size of ownership stake and the 
incentive to monitor are positively correlated.  Concentrated ownership can also provide better control 
of management (Jensen and Meckling 1976), which can benefit minority shareholders by improving 
the monitoring of managers (Shleifer and Vishn 1997). On the other hand, it can come with costs for 
minority shareholders as controlling owners might try to expropriate greater benefits from the firm 
(Grant and Kirchmaier 2004). 
H5: Concentrated ownership leads to better financial performance in Islamic banks. 
Ownership may exist in one of the following six forms, namely blockholding, director ownership, 
family ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership, institutional ownership, and 
management ownership (Abbas et al. 2009). 
Blockholding, also called concentrated ownership, incurs the least agency cost given that the owner 
did not trade the control of assets with management (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Hence 
H6: Blockholding adds value to the financial performance of Islamic banks. 
Even though share ownership by directors may provide incentives for directors to exercise diligent 
monitoring, the massive shareholding by directors may conflict with the interests of the other 
shareholders.  
H7: Director ownership has a negative impact on the financial performance of Islamic banks.  
Family ownership is expected to be positively related to firm performance since it helps reduce the 
agency costs of separation of ownership and control. In this type of firms, the interest of the managers 
is naturally aligned with those of the owners since the owners are also the managers who could bring 
benefits to the firms (Abbas et al. 2009). 
H8: Higher family ownership is associated with higher financial performance in Islamic banks. 
Kho and Stulz (1997) find no evidence that the foreign investors outperform the local investor in 
Japan. Moreover De Young and Nolle (1996) and Elyasiani and Mehdian (1997) found that foreign-
owned banks were not as profitable as domestically owned banks. De Young and Nolle (1996) 
reasoned out that foreign owned banks were less profitable because of their reliance on purchased 
funds. Elyasiani and Mehdian (1997) concluded that foreign-owned banks tend to be less cost-
efficient than domestic banks, which in turn affects profitability.  
H9: Foreign ownership has negative relationship with financial performance of Islamic banks. 
Ab Razak et al. (2008) argued that the government ownership contribute positively to performance, 
mostly due to the investments made by government through their various government related 
companies. It is believe that a government will take action to avoid underperforms of their investment 
in companies in which they invest. Based on these arguments the study hypothesizes that: 
H10: Higher the government ownership has positive effect on financial performance of Islamic banks. 
The emergence of institutional investors (owners) as active owners has resulted in studies 
investigating their role as active monitoring agents for enhancing firm performance. It is argued that 
only large shareholders such as the institutional investors can achieve sufficient benefits to have the 
incentive to monitor managers and members of the board (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). However, the 
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assignment of representatives – agents of the institutions would incur extra agency cost and hence 
making the institutions ‘inactive’. 
H11: Institutional investors have a positive impact on financial performance of Islamic banks. 
Management ownership may align the interest of the managers and shareholders and hence improve 
the financial performance (van Essen and Osterhout 2008).  
H12: Management ownership is positively associated with financial performance of Islamic banks.  
2.6 Auditing 
Auditing facilitates the Shari”ah compliance and encourages the Islamic banks to adopt appropriate 
financial reporting codes and good practice (Brown et al. 2011).  
H13: Auditing is positively correlated with financial performance of Islamic banks. 
 
    Table 1 Definition of the variables 
Variable Definition 
Board size Number of board of directors 
 Financial performance 
 
ROA, ROI, Tobin’s Q 
Board independence Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Shari”ah Supervisory 
Board 
The SSB size, percentage of SSB members on top 20 ranking 
 CEO duality Whether the CEO is also chairman. 
Ownership structure The percentage of shares held by the largest five shareholders. 
Auditing Whether the firm has been externally audited. 
Director ownership The proportion of shares held by the directors. 
Family ownership Whether the largest shareholder is family. 
Foreign ownership Whether foreigner own shares. 
Government ownership  Whether the largest shareholder is the government. 
Institutional ownership Whether the largest shareholder is the institution. 
Blockholding Whether the shares are held by the largest three shareholders. 
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METHODOLOGY, DATA AND RESULTS 
The methodology included a meta-analysis of existing research to identify previous research and 
testing of hypotheses based on the evidence derived from these previous studies.  
Meta-analysis 
To address the theoretical debates and to consolidate existing knowledge, this study systematically 
reviewed all the empirical evidence obtainable from a number of database sources specified below. 
Literature which met the criteria was quantified to test the statistical hypothesis using a meta-analysis 
approach.   
Sampling and coding 
Five complementary strategies were used to identify the population of studies on corporate governance 
and financial performance of Islamic Banks,   (Li. et al. 2013). First,   six databases were searched 
using key terms, “board”, “board of directors”, “board size”, “board independence”, “Shari”ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB)”, “CEO duality”, “ownership structure”, “blockholding”, “director 
ownership”, “family ownership”, “foreign ownership”, “government ownership”, “institutional 
ownership”, “management ownership”, “auditing”, “board characteristics”, “governance”, and 
“corporate governance”, married with “Islamic Banks”, “Islamic Financial Institutions”. The databases 
include (1) JSTOR; (2) ProQuest ; (3) ABI/INFORM Global; (4) EconLit; (5) SSRN; (6) Google 
Scholar.  
Second, a search was conducted of the most relevant journals suggested by the Australian Research 
Council’s ERA Ranking in the fields of accounting, economics, finance and management. Third, after 
collecting an initial set of studies,    a “snow-balling” technique  cross-checked the reference that cited 
the original journals using Scopus and Google Scholar.  An initial sample of 41 literature sources 
yielded 39 published or unpublished articles and 2 recent PhD theses.  
 
Given that our research focus is on the correlation of board size and firm performance, Each article 
was then checked against the six criteria, specified as follows: 
(1) The paper is not an earlier version of another paper included in our sample;  
(2) The paper is an empirical study that includes either a regression or a correlation analysis, as 
long as the impact size is estimable; 
(3) The sample used in the empirical research must be a cohort of Islamic banks , or have an 
Islamic cohort, whose effect size are reported separately and can be obtained. Thus, our 
sample includes articles on Islamic banks as well as Islamic financial institutions;    
(4) Corporate governance mechanisms must be a separate variable and must be identifiable;  
(5) The paper only focused on using financial performance related measures as the dependent 
variable. 
(6) The full text of the article must be obtainable. 
 
Applying the above six criteria, resulted in twelve articles (Table 2).  
 
Coding and analysis 
Two main types of data are encountered in the sample: correlation coefficients with sample size, and 
regression results (either a t-statistics or p-value) with sample size.  
The data were analysed using a commercial coding package, Comprehensive Meta Analysis . The 
build-in functions and consistency in correcting estimation errors exempt the coding from human 
calculation errors. The Hedges and Olkin (1985) (HOMA) procedure is computed in STATA12SE  
environment. Observations with missing values on either the corporate governance variable or 
financial performance variable are dropped. 
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HOMA procedure 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient r and partial correlation coefficient rxy,z are 
commonly used in meta-analysis, given that they are scale-free, can be easily interpreted and 
computed, eg. using the HOMA procedure in STATA. Only studies in which performance variables 
are dependent variables are partial coefficients calculated .  In our study, when multiple measures of 
firm performance are provided,   all the available measurements from the sample were included in the 
study. In order to account for the differences in precision across effect sizes and variability in the 
population, the HOMA procedure, which treats the inverse variance weight was the optimal measure 
of precision for a given effect size. These weights will help to produce appropriate estimates for the 
meta-analytic mean effect size (van Essen and Oosterhout et al. 2012). The HOMA procedure will be 
used to estimate Hypothesis 1-12.  
 
A mapping between the selected literature and effect sizes of corporate governance mechanisms is 
shown in Table 3.  
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Table 2 Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Citation Financial performance measure Corporate governance measure Publish Type Year 
Cross-
sectional 
Data 
collection 
Country Data-
Year N 
Muttakin, M., H. 
Arouri, et al. (2011) ROA(EBIT) 
Ownership concentration, 
Foreign ownership, 
Institutional ownership, 
board size, CEO duality 
Journal article 2011 1 Database GCC countries 2008 27 
Bino, A., and Tomar, 
S. (2012) 
ROA, ROE, Total assets, Loans 
loss provisions ratio 
board of directors' 
composition, managerial 
ownership percentage, 
board of directors' 
ownership percentage, 
board size 
Journal article 2012 0 Database Jordan 1997-2006 140 
Al-Saidi, M. and B. 
Al-Shammari (2013) ROA, Tobin's Q 
Non-executive director, 
family directors, role 
duality, board size, 
ownership concentration 
Journal article 2013 0 Database Kuwait 1996-2010 45 
Safieddine, A. (2009) 
Total assets, Market capitalization, 
total revenue, revenue growth, net 
profits, net profit growth, 12 
months index-adjusted returns, 6 
months index-adjusted returns, 
price to earnings ratio, price to 
book ratio 
Corporate governance 
index Journal article 2009 1 Survey  
GCC 
countries   29 
          
Zouari, S. B. S. and 
N. B. Taktak (2012) 
Debt ratio, Capital adequacy ratio, 
total assets Ownership structure Working paper 2012 0 Database Global 
2005-
2009 265 
S., A. and W. A., 
Boustancy  (2008) Net profit 
Ownership structure, CEO 
duality Journal article 2008 0 Database MENA 
1998-
2003 89 
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Table 2 Studies included in the meta-analysis (Cont’d) 
Citation Financial performance measure Corporate governance measure 
Publication 
Type Year 
Cross-
sectional 
Data 
collection 
Country Data-
Year N 
M., A. (2012) 
ROA, Loan loss reserves to gross 
loans, loan loss provisions to gross 
loans, equity to total assets, total 
assets, liquidity to total assets 
Shari”ah supervisory board 
size, percentage of SSB 
members with top twenty 
rankings, SSB composition 
changes or not 
Unpublished 
work 2012 0 Database Global 
2000-
2010 521 
Abbas, S. Z. B. M., 
R. A. Rahman, et al. 
(2009) 
Non-performing loans, ROE Ownership structure Conference paper 2009 0 Database Malaysia 
2000-
2006 200 
Adnan, M. A., S. N. 
N. Htay, et al. (2011) 
Efficiency (Non-performing loans to 
total loans; operating expense to total 
assets) 
Board independence, board 
size, ownership structure Journal article 2011 0 Database Malaysia 
1996-
2005 108 
Al-Tamimi, H., H. 
A., et al. (2013) Risk-weighted assets/total assets Ownership structure Journal article 2013 0 Database UAE 
1998-
2010 52 
Bukhari, K. S., M. A. 
Hayat, et al. (2013)  
Financial performance 
 
Auditing, Board of 
directors, SSB Journal article 2013 0 Survey  Pakistan   36 
Al Manaseer, M. F., 
R. M. Al-Hindawi, et 
al. (2012) 
ROA, ROE, Profit margin, Earnings 
per share 
Board independence, board 
size, ownership structure, 
CEO duality 
Journal article 2012 0 Database Jordan 2007-2009 45 
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Table 3  Articles including effect size for each of the corporate governance mechanisms 
Citation Board 
independence 
Shari”ah Supervisory 
Board 
Board size CEO 
duality 
Ownership Structure Auditing 
Muttakin, M., H. Arouri, et al. (2011)     X X X   
Bino, A., and Tomar, S. (2012)     X   X   
Al-Saidi, M. and B. Al-Shammari (2013) X   X X X X 
Safieddine, A. (2009) X X X X     
Zouari, S. B. S. and N. B. Taktak (2012)         X   
S., A. and W. A., Boustancy  (2008)         X   
M., A. (2012)   X   X     
Abbas, S. Z. B. M., R. A. Rahman, et al. (2009)         X   
Adnan, M. A., S. N. N. Htay, et al. (2011) X X     X   
Al-Tamimi, H., H. A., et al. (2013)         X   
Bukhari, K. S., M. A. Hayat, et al. (2013)    X X     X 
Al Manaseer, M. F., R. M. Al-Hindawi, et al. (2012) X   X X X   
Note:X – the article has been included to abstract effect sizes. Blank cells indicate that the corresponding article was no included in the meta-analysis of the corresponding 
corporate governance mechanism. 
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Results 
The hypotheses test results are shown in Table 4 in the Appendix. The effect size, number of articles and meta-analyses results were reported in Table 3-4. 
Hypotheses 1-4, 7-10 and 12-13 have to be accepted. Hypotheses 5, 6, 11 have to be rejected. Hypothesis 12 was not statistically significant.  
Table 4 Meta-analysis results 
Predictor K N Effect size  z p CI 95%  Q test 
Board independence 15 625 0.15 5.98 0.000 0.100/0.201 180.87(0.00) 
Shari”ah Supervisory Board 32 4739 0.11 2.86 0.004 0.033/0.177 432.51(0.00) 
Board size 21 922 0.08 3.43 0.001 0.035/0.126 99.47(0.00) 
CEO duality 19 705 0.11 1.97 0.049 0.000/0.222 90.05(0.00) 
Auditing 12 355 1.06 2.13 0.033 0.013/0.301 78.98(0.00) 
Ownership structure 44 6010 -0.23 17.34 0.000 -0.252/-0.201 16177.19(0.00) 
      Blockholding 7 442 -0.82 2.03 0.000 -1.608/-0.030 476(0.00) 
      Director ownership 4 496 -0.76 16.75 0.000 -0.850/-0.672 1522.581(0.00) 
      Family ownership 5 976 0.827 25.63 0.000 0.764/0.890 1947.04(0.00) 
      Foreign ownership 10 1164 -0.603 20.30 0.000 -0.661/-0.544 812.40(0.00) 
      Government ownership  6 1065 0.877 28.39 0.000 0.817/0.938 2078.15(0.00) 
      Institutional ownership 10 1499 -0.992 38.03 0.000 -1.043/-0.941 5522.89(0.00) 
      Management ownership 2 280 -0.078 -1.286 0.199 -0.196/0.041 0.085(0.771) 
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The meta-analyses shows that Islamic banks tends to have better financial performance if (1) a higher 
proportion of independent directors on the board; (2) Shari”ah Supervisory Board is larger and is 
consist of top scholars; (3) more directors sitting on the board; (4) CEO is also the chairman of the 
board of directors; (5) internal and external auditing are enforced and (6) ownership structure were 
more dispersed, directors’ shareholding were reduced, foreigners shareholding were reduced, 
institutional investors’ shareholding were reduced, while family and governments’ shareholding were 
increased. (7) Managers’ shareholding was insignificant. 
The summary of the statistical hypotheses and the test results are listed in Table 5.  
Table 5 Comparison of statistical hypothesis and test results 
Hypothesis No.  Corporate governance mechanism Hypothesized sign Test result 
1 Board independence + 0.15*** 
2 Shari”ah Supervisory Board + 0.11*** 
3 Board size + 0.08*** 
4 CEO duality + 0.11* 
5 Ownership structure + -0.23*** 
6 Blockholding /Concentrated ownership + -0.82*** 
7 Director ownership - -0.76*** 
8 Family ownership + 0.827*** 
9 Foreign ownership - -0.603*** 
10 Government ownership  + 0.877*** 
11 Institutional ownership + -0.992*** 
12 Management ownership + -0.078 
13 Auditing + 1.06* 
 
Four of the thirteen statistical hypotheses (highlighted in Table 5), namely ownership structure, 
blockholding, institutional ownership and management ownership contradict our hypotheses. The 
synthesise of the previous literature shows that a dispersed ownership structure, rather than a 
concentrated one, regardless of the blockholding of family, institutions, government, foreigners, 
managers, directors, is favourable for financial performance of Islamic banks, which is reconfirmed 
by the results on blockholding. The meta-analysis results indicate that less institutional ownership 
results in better financial performance, which is contradictory to the widely accepted evidence in the 
research into conventional banks. The role institutional ownership plays merits further investigation. 
Management ownership is not significant.  
Limitations of the study  
As with every meta-analysis, this study is subject to limitations. Some limitations are inherent in the 
primary studies. For example, all studies included in our meta-analysis exclusively examine surviving 
firms, and none corrected for survival bias. In addition, attempting to trace the validity and credibility 
of the data as well as analytical strategies used in the original studies is a ‘mission impossible’.  
Moreover, the systematic review of the major database also flags a number of concerns for the 
researchers, listed as follows: 
i. Corporate governance in Islamic banks suffers from having a shadowy existence in business 
and economics. Articles reviewed here are mostly published in niche journals. Over the past decade, 
Islamic banks have come to the fore and academic research has increasingly attempted to understand 
how those banks differ from their conventional counterparts. However, most efforts have been 
devoted to comparisons between the Islamic banking and Conventional banking sectors, while studis 
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purely focusing on Islamic banks rarely appear in top journals in Economics, Finance and 
Management disciplines. 
ii. Lack of a systematic solid evidence base left the Islamic bank related corporate governance 
research in an impasse of conceptualisation. Only two studies out of twelve in the review have a 
sample size larger than 200, albeit some are still using logit and probit models to test statistical 
hypothesis. The robustness of the empirical results has to be cross-validated in order to obtain a stable 
and parsimonious model.  
iii. The data on corporate governance of Islamic banks is at a dearth. It will be a luxury for 
researchers if future endeavours should attempt to develop an objective and reliable database with 
corporate governance data for Islamic banks worldwide. 
iv. Collaboration and communication among Islamic bank researchers and practitioners should 
be reinforced. The reviewer articles flagged the issues that there are overlaps in the research topic but 
the story may conflict and not be comparable because of the use of different data sources.    
Future research efforts can be devoted to the establishment of an Islamic corporate governance 
database, a singular focus on the analysis of the impact of corporate governance on financial 
performance of the Islamic banking sector, and an in-depth investigation of the role institutional 
investors and management ownership play in the governance of Islamic banks.  
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